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I. INTRODUCTION 
The California Constitution expressly states that all political power is 
inherent in the people.1  In order to enforce this political power, California 
has a unique initiative system in which the electors propose statutes and 
amendments to the California Constitution, and then vote to adopt or reject 
them.2  As a result of this system, California voters possess a great deal of 
power in influencing California statutes and the California Constitution, 
and their wishes sometimes differ from those of their elected officials.3 
In November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, an 
amendment to the California Constitution that defined marriage in 
California as between a man and a woman.4  The passing of Proposition 8 
launched a frenzy of litigation attacking the constitutionality of this state 
constitutional amendment.5  Central to this litigation, beyond questions of 
Due Process and Equal Protection, is the question of who may challenge 
the provision in federal court.6  This question first arose when, following 
                                                          
 1. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that government exists for the people, 
and that the people may alter or reform it when public good requires it). 
 2. See id. § 8 (defining the initiative power as the power of electors to propose and 
vote on amendments to the California Constitution, and outlining the process by which 
an elector can place an initiative on the ballot). 
 3. See, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68, 75 (Cal. 1986) 
(finding that state officials might not vigorously defend a recently passed ordinance if 
they have an underlying opposition to the ordinance). 
 4. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (asserting that only marriage between a man and 
woman is valid and recognized in California). 
 5. See Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 671 F.3d 1052, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the District Court’s ruling that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional); Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional under the United States Constitution); Strauss v. Horton, 
207 P.3d 48, 140 (Cal. 2009) (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (finding that 
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the California Constitution). 
 6. See Perry III, 671 F.3d at 1064 (acknowledging that before the court may 
consider the constitutional question raised in Proposition 8, it first must decide whether 
the initiative proponents have standing). 
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the District Court’s finding that Proposition 8 violated the United States 
Constitution, defendant-intervenors who had sponsored the initiative 
sought to bring the appeal in the place of the named defendants.7  The 
standing doctrine is the first hurdle that a party must overcome when 
seeking to bring a case, and this requirement must be met by parties 
bringing an appeal as well.8  In the latest case surrounding the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that 
the defendant-intervenors were the proper party to bring the appeal, and 
proceeded to decide the case on its merits.9 
This Comment argues that the proponents of Proposition 8 do not have 
standing under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and other federal standing 
precedent to bring an appeal in the Ninth Circuit because they have not 
suffered a particularized injury.10  Part II outlines the federal standing 
doctrine, including an examination of relevant case law, and provides 
background on the current Proposition 8 litigation.11  Part III argues that the 
California Supreme Court analyzed the question of whether the Proponents 
have standing under the incorrect standard.12  Part III then argues that the 
Ninth Circuit should not have given deference to the California Supreme 
Court’s decision because it is bound by federal standing law, and the 
Proponents do not meet the injury-in-fact requirement.13  Part IV suggests 
that Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife’s assertion that statutorily-created 
injuries do not automatically confer standing should be applied to state 
courts as well.14  Finally, Part V concludes that the reviewing court should 
find that initiative proponents do not meet the injury-in-fact requirement of 
Article III standing, and therefore the proponents of Proposition 8 do not 
                                                          
 7. See Perry v. Brown (Perry II), 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1130 (2011) (explaining that 
none of the named defendants sought to appeal from the District Court’s ruling, and 
thus the proponents were the only party to bring an appeal). 
 8. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 55 (1986) (holding that standing must be 
met at every step of the litigation).  See generally Heather Elliot, The Functions of 
Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460-63 (2008) (discussing that the three main 
functions of standing are the concrete-adversity function, the pro-democracy function, 
and the anti-conscription function). 
 9. See Perry III, 671 F.3d at 1068 (deciding that the initiative proponents are 
entitled to appeal from a decision that enjoined the enforcement of a measure they 
sponsored). 
 10. See infra Part V (concluding that the reviewing court should find that the 
proponents of Proposition 8 do not have standing to bring an appeal in federal court). 
 11. See infra Part II (defining the federal standing doctrine, analyzing the injury-in-
fact requirement, and outlining the history of Perry v. Brown). 
 12. See infra Part III.A (differentiating between the standard to intervene and the 
requirements for Article III standing). 
 13. See infra Part III.B (discussing the California Supreme Court’s decision and 
arguing that this decision should not be controlling in federal court). 
 14. See infra Part IV (examining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and applying it to state courts). 
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have standing to appeal the lower court’s decision.15 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Federal Standing Doctrine 
While the United States Constitution prescribes Article III federal courts 
with a great deal of power, these courts are bound by their obligation to 
solely hear “cases or controversies.”16  This requirement is enforced by the 
standing doctrine.17  A party has standing to bring a case if three 
requirements are met.18  As articulated by Lujan, these requirements are: 
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and conduct complained of; and (3) it 
must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.19  
Each element must be met for the court to determine that a party has 
standing.20  Moreover, these requirements must be met by parties seeking 
to bring an appeal, regardless of whether the party intervened in the 
previous proceedings.21 
The injury-in-fact requirement is regarded as the most difficult element 
to prove, and is the most litigated of the three elements.22  In Lujan, the 
                                                          
 15. See infra Part V (concluding that a strict standing requirement is necessary to 
uphold important functions of Article III courts and that the reviewing court should 
find that the proponents of Proposition 8, absent state officials, do not have standing to 
bring an appeal). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that Article III courts have jurisdiction 
over all cases with constitutional questions, in which the United States is a party, and 
controversies between two or more states, between a state and a citizen, between 
citizens of different states, or between a state and a federal entity). 
 17. See Elliot, supra note 8, at 461 (explaining that the standing doctrine serves to 
restrict the cases heard in the federal courts solely to “cases” and “controversies” under 
Article III). 
 18. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (holding that federal case law has identified a 
constitutional minimum of three requirements which serve to identify those disputes 
which are properly resolved through the judicial process). 
 19. See id. (setting forth the three recognized requirements for Article III standing, 
most commonly known as injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability); see also Allen 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (holding that to have standing, a party must allege 
a personal injury that is fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct and likely to be 
redressed by a favorable court decision). 
 20. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (holding that if the injury-in-fact requirement is 
not met, standing may not be granted). 
 21. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62-64 (1986) (ruling that a party that 
intervened in the lower court still must prove standing to bring an appeal). 
 22. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-41 (1972) (holding that a 
corporation did not have standing to sue for an injunction against a potentially harmful 
construction project absent a showing that the corporation or its members would be 
affected in any meaningful way); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157-66 
(1990) (holding that an inmate did not have standing to challenge the death sentence of 
another inmate because the petitioner did not suffer a concrete injury and did not meet 
the requirements of “next friend” standing). 
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seminal case shedding light on the injury-in-fact requirement, a group of 
organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation brought an action against 
the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that a recently 
promulgated regulation was outside the Secretary’s scope of duties.23  In 
evaluating whether the plaintiffs had standing, the Court articulated that to 
meet the requirement for standing, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
invasion of a legally protected interest, the interest must be concrete and 
particularized, and the injury must be actual or imminent.24  Because their 
injury was not specific and was merely conjectural, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs did not meet the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.25 
The Court in Lujan also recognized that while Congress can declare that 
certain acts constitute injuries to the public, Congress cannot bypass the 
concrete injury requirement by creating statutes.26  Therefore, a party 
bringing a grievance against the government still must prove that he or she 
was injured in some particular way.27  Because of this requirement, the 
Court acknowledged that it is difficult to establish standing in a case 
against the government when the party bringing the suit is not the direct 
and particular object of the government action or inaction in question.28 
The Lujan Court further provides that a party bringing a generalized 
grievance that is common to all members of the public does not meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement.29  This prohibition against generalized 
grievances is more extensively discussed in United States v. Richardson.30  
In Richardson, the plaintiff brought a suit asking the federal court to 
                                                          
 23. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64 (discussing the plaintiffs’ claim that they were 
injured because the environmentally harmful regulation left them unable to continue to 
observe endangered and threatened species). 
 24. See id. at 560 (holding that an injury-in-fact may not be conjectural or 
hypothetical). 
 25. See id. at 563-64 (ruling that the plaintiffs’ claim that they would be harmed in 
a hypothetical way at an indeterminate time in the future was insufficient for a finding 
of standing). 
 26. See id. at 576-78 (holding that Congress cannot legislatively create individual 
rights, and that allowing Congress to broaden the categories of injury that a party may 
allege in support of Article III standing is the functional equivalent of abandoning the 
injury-in-fact requirement altogether). 
 27. See id. at 575 (holding that a party bringing a suit against the government must 
show either that his injury is not common to the public, or that his injury lies in the 
failure of the government to follow a statute). 
 28. See id. at 562 (finding that there is a higher/more demanding burden to show 
that a plaintiff is injured by government action when that action targets someone other 
than the plaintiff). 
 29. See id. at 573-74 (holding that a generally available grievance about 
government, common to every citizen’s interest in the proper upholding of the law, 
does not satisfy the case or controversy requirement). 
 30. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (holding that a 
party may not assert an injury that is shared equally by a substantial portion of the 
population). 
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declare that the Central Intelligence Agency’s budget was being spent in 
violation of the Constitution.31  In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the Court 
noted that his alleged injury was overbroad.32  The Court also rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument that if he was unable to litigate this issue, no one could 
do so in his place, holding instead that this was the principal purpose of a 
representative democracy.33 
The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Charles established that a plaintiff 
must prove standing at every step of the proceedings in federal court, and a 
party seeking to bring an appeal in the place of an original party must show 
independent standing.34  This principle was explored in Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, in which the plaintiff brought a claim in federal 
court challenging the validity of a ballot initiative recently passed by the 
Arizona Legislature establishing English as the official language of the 
state.35  The plaintiff named as defendants several state officials in their 
official capacities.36  The District Court found that the new law was 
unconstitutional.37  The proponents of the ballot initiative, the Arizonans 
for Official English (AOE), then moved to intervene as defendants to 
support the initiative in light of the Governor’s failure to appeal, and sought 
to bring the appeal in this capacity.38  AOE asserted standing based on the 
funds and efforts that the group expended in sponsoring a successful ballot 
                                                          
 31. See id. at 169 (noting that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was his inability to 
obtain a document that set out the agency’s expenditures, and therefore he could not 
fulfill his obligations as an informed member of the electorate). 
 32. See id. at 176-80 (finding that the impact on the plaintiff was common to all 
members of the public, and reasoning that the standing doctrine is designed to prevent 
these generalized grievances); see also Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) 
(requiring the plaintiff to show that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of 
sustaining a direct injury as the result of government action). 
 33. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 (finding that a citizen who is unsatisfied with 
a law may appeal to the electoral process rather than rely solely on the courts for a 
remedy). 
 34. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (holding that intervenors must 
show independent standing to bring an appeal when the original party fails to do so). 
But see People v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 64 P. 399, 400 (Cal. 1901) (holding that, under 
California law, an intervenor has standing to appeal from an adverse judgment in 
California court). 
 35. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1997) 
(explaining that the plaintiff was concerned that the initiative would prevent her from 
adequately performing the duties of her job). 
 36. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Ariz. 1990) (naming 
Arizona Governor, Arizona Attorney General, and Director of Arizona’s Department of 
Administration as defendants). 
 37. See id. at 310, 314-16 (finding that the new law was “facially overbroad” 
because it imposed a sweeping ban on the use of any language except for English rather 
than simply requiring that official business be conducted in English). 
 38. See Yniguez v. Arizona (Yniguez II), 939 F.2d 727, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that the Arizona Governor was the only remaining defendant, leaving no one 
else to file an appeal). 
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initiative.39  The District Court denied its motion, finding that AOE had no 
standing to bring the appeal.40  The Ninth Circuit, however, found that 
AOE did have standing to bring the case as appellants, but noted that this 
was a limited right.41  After granting certiorari to review whether AOE had 
standing to bring the appeal, the Supreme Court first reestablished the 
principle that a party seeking Article III standing must show an invasion of 
a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized.42  The Court 
then affirmed that it has never granted standing to initiative proponents to 
defend measures for which they advocated and declined to do so in this 
case.43 
A party must show standing to appeal even if it was previously granted 
the right to intervene because there is a lower threshold to be an intervenor 
than an original party.44  A judge must allow intervention when a party 
meets a specific burden demonstrating that it would be unjust to keep the 
party out of the litigation.45  Alternatively, a judge may grant a motion to 
intervene to a party who shares a common question of law or fact with the 
main parties.46  On the other hand, the burden to prove standing is stringent, 
and certainly harder to meet than the requirement a party must prove in 
order to be granted intervention.47 
                                                          
 39. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (noting the proponents’ argument that they have 
a quasi-legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they 
successfully sponsored). 
 40. See Yniguez II, 939 F.2d at 730 (discussing the District Court’s ruling that the 
labor and funds AOE spent to promote the ballot initiative did not meet the requirement 
for standing to sue or defend in a federal court). 
 41. See id. at 733 (ruling that AOE only had standing to make an argument on the 
question of the initiative’s constitutionality). 
 42. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 64 (holding that the Article III standing requirement 
must be met by parties seeking appellate review as well as parties appearing in courts 
of first instance). 
 43. See id. at 65 (holding that initiative sponsors are not agents of the people, and 
thus have no authority to defend the constitutionality of initiatives in the place of public 
officials). 
 44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (outlining the requirements for intervention of right and 
permissive intervention). 
 45. See id. at 24(a)(2) (providing that a judge must grant a party’s motion to 
intervene when the party filed a timely motion, has an interest relating to the subject of 
the action, might be unable to defend or protect this interest, and will not be protected 
in that interest by the present parties); see also Motion to Intervene at *6-11, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 VRW, 2009 WL 1499309 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(describing when a party must be granted intervention as of right, and arguing that the 
Proponents met this burden). 
 46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (declaring that a judge may grant a motion to 
intervene if the party is given a right to intervene by statute or the party has a claim or 
defense that shares a common question with the main action). 
 47. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (holding that 
unless all standing requirements of Article III are met, a party is unable to bring a case 
in federal court). 
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B. Proposition 8 Litigation 
In November 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, an initiative 
that created a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in California.48  
Following the passage of Proposition 8, several same-sex couples filed 
suits in California seeking to invalidate the proposition on state 
constitutional grounds.49  In Strauss v. Horton, the California Supreme 
Court considered whether Proposition 8 was a permissible change to the 
California Constitution, and, if so, what effect it had on the marriages 
performed before it was adopted.50  The court ruled that Proposition 8 was 
constitutional under the California Constitution; however, California 
enjoyed a five-month period prior to the passage of Proposition 8 in which 
same-sex marriage was legal, and the court left the 18,000 marriages 
performed during this time intact.51 
Three days before the California Supreme Court issued a ruling in 
Strauss, two same-sex couples in California filed a separate lawsuit in the 
United States District Court challenging the validity of Proposition 8 under 
the Fourteenth Amendment; this federal case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
(later Perry v. Brown) forms the basis of the current Proposition 8 
litigation.52  The plaintiffs in this case, Perry et. al., sought to prevent state 
and local officials from enforcing Proposition 8 on federal constitutional 
grounds.53  The suit named several state officials as defendants in their 
official capacities.54  In July 2009, before any of the defendants were able 
to respond to the suit, the District Court granted the official proponents of 
Proposition 8 (“Proponents”) permissive intervention to defend the validity 
of the initiative they had sponsored.55  Following the Proponents’ motion 
                                                          
 48. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (stating that only marriage between a man and a 
woman is recognized in California). 
 49. See generally Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (examining the 
validity of Proposition 8 under the California Constitution). 
 50. See id. at 57 (discussing that the court must address this issue because a 2008 
California Supreme Court decision, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), 
allowed same-sex couples to marry in California). 
 51. See id. at 64 (holding that Proposition 8 was a valid amendment to the 
California Constitution because it was approved by a majority of the voters). 
 52. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(asserting that Proposition 8 violates the United States Constitution on Due Process and 
Equal Protection grounds). 
 53. See id. at 928 (finding that Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution). 
 54. See id. (naming California’s Governor, California’s Attorney General, 
California’s Director and Deputy Director of Public Health, the Alameda County 
Clerk-Recorder, and the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk as 
defendants). 
 55. See id. at 930 (citing the considerable time and effort the Proponents spent 
campaigning for the initiative as a reason to grant intervention). 
8
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss1/7
  
2012] CALIFORNIA NOTWITHSTANDING 171 
for intervention, then-Attorney General Brown conceded that Proposition 8 
violated the United States Constitution, and the other defendants refused to 
take a position on the initiative.56  None of the named defendants chose to 
defend the initiative, and as a result, the Proponents have been the sole 
party defending the initiative.57 
On August 4, 2010, the District Court ruled that Proposition 8 was 
unconstitutional.58  In his opinion, Judge Walker first found that the 
proposition did not meet the rational basis test required by Due Process 
because California has no interest in discriminating against gays and 
lesbians.59  Second, he found that Proposition 8 violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.60  Because it violated 
the United States Constitution, the court permanently enjoined California 
from enforcing Proposition 8.61  Following this decision, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s order pending appeal; 
consequently, Proposition 8 will stay in effect until the termination of the 
litigation.62 
Shortly after the District Court issued its ruling, the Proponents, in their 
capacity as defendant-intervenors, filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit.63  In 
a brief to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the Proponents lacked 
standing to appeal.64  The Proponents responded that they did meet the 
standing requirements in both California and federal courts.65  On January 
4, 2011, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme 
                                                          
 56. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1129 (2011) (noting that Attorney General 
Brown went further in his answer to the complaint filed by the plaintiff, claiming that 
Proposition 8 was constitutionally infirm). 
 57. See id. at 1130 (stating that the Proponents, unlike the other parties to the 
litigation, presented witnesses and argued in favor of the initiative in the District 
Court). 
 58. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (finding that California has no legitimate 
interest in discriminating against same-sex couples and that Proposition 8 prevents 
California from providing marriages equally). 
 59. See id. (holding that to survive rational basis review, a law must have a purpose 
other than to place a particular group at a disadvantage). 
 60. See id. (reasoning that Proposition 8 prevents California from providing 
marriages on an equal basis). 
 61. Cf. id. at 1003-04 (allowing California to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples). 
 62. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1130 (allowing parties to file an appeal before the 
ruling goes into effect). 
 63. See Perry III, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that the Proponents 
filed a timely appeal); see also Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1130-31 (noting that none of the 
named defendants appealed from the District Court’s decision, and, as a result, none of 
the initially named defendants are a party to the appeal). 
 64. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1131 (contending that the case should be dismissed 
for lack of standing). 
 65. See id. (arguing that Proponents had standing to intervene both in the present 
litigation and in Strauss). 
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Court asking whether the proponents have standing under California law.66  
The Ninth Circuit regarded the state law question as necessary to the 
threshold determination of whether the Proponents possessed Article III 
standing.67 
On November 17, 2011, the California Supreme Court ruled that under 
California law, the official proponents of an initiative are authorized to 
assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity because it is essential to 
the integrity of the initiative power that there be someone to defend the 
initiative when public officials refuse to do so.68  In this ruling, the court 
relied on California Supreme Court cases that allowed official proponents 
to intervene as formal parties in California courts to defend their 
initiatives.69  However, the court pointed out that, since it answered the first 
part of the Ninth Circuit’s question in the affirmative, it did not need to 
answer the second part of whether the proponents possess a “particularized 
interest.”70 
On February 7, 2012, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling finding that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.71  In doing so, the court first 
determined that the Proponents had standing to bring the appeal.72  In 
making this determination, the Ninth Circuit gave significant deference to 
the California Supreme Court’s decision granting standing to initiative 
proponents.73  Following this decision, the Proponents of Proposition 8 
filed a request for rehearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit, which was 
                                                          
 66. See Order Certifying a Question to the Supreme Court of California, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (asking whether the 
proponents may defend the constitutionality of an initiative when the public officials 
who ordinarily do so decline, or whether under the California Constitution and the 
initiative power granted therein the official proponents of an initiative measure have a 
particularized interest in that measure’s validity). 
 67. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1131-32 (indicating that the California Supreme 
Court’s answer to the question of standing may be determinative on the issue). 
 68. See id. at 1151-52 (reasoning that the official proponents of an initiative are in 
the best position to defend the initiative’s validity); see also id. at 1132 (ruling that 
state officials lack the power to de facto invalidate a measure). 
 69. See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68, 75 (Cal. 1986) 
(holding that a trial court should ordinarily permit proponents of an initiative to 
intervene when a city or county is required to defend the initiative). 
 70. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1139 (finding that a response to the second part of 
the question was irrelevant after deciding that the Proponents may defend the initiative 
in court). 
 71. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
Proposition 8 violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution on 
Due Process and Equal Protection grounds). 
 72. See id. at 1064 (concluding that proponents of a ballot measure must have 
standing to defend the measure in federal court if the state authorizes the initiative 
proponents to do so). 
 73. See id. (holding that the state may decide who is authorized to assert its 
interests in federal courts). 
10
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subsequently denied.74  The Proponents have since filed a petition for 
certiorari with the Supreme Court, requesting review of the Ninth Circuit 
decision.75 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The California Supreme Court Examined the Incorrect Question 
Regarding Standing, Because the Plaintiffs Do Not Argue That the 
Proponents Should Not Have Been Allowed to Intervene in the 
Proceedings, but Rather That There Is a Stricter Standard in Federal 
Courts for Standing than for Intervention. 
The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the Proponents have 
standing in federal court to appeal the District Court’s judgment absent the 
official defendants, not whether the Proponents should be allowed to 
intervene in the litigation as the California Supreme Court seems to argue.76  
In response to the Ninth Circuit’s certified question, the California 
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was no statutory law in California 
that governed the answer to the question before it.77  The court also 
recognized that in most California cases in which initiative proponents 
have been authorized to assert the interest of the state, there was no 
challenge to the initiative proponents’ participation as a party, and therefore 
the court was not faced with the question of whether the proponents’ 
participation was proper.78  Despite this key distinction, the California 
                                                          
 74. See generally Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 
11-16577, 2012 WL 541541 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012) (arguing that the panel majority 
erred in their application of case law and that its decision conflicts with controlling 
precedent); see also Perry v. Brown, 681 F.3d 1065 (2012) (denying petition for 
rehearing). 
 75. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-
144, 2012 WL 3109489 (July 30, 2012) (requesting that the Supreme Court agree to 
hear Proponents’ argument that Proposition 8 does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 76. See, e.g., Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1147 (2011) (pointing out that the 
plaintiffs have not cited any instances in which the official proponents of an initiative 
were prohibited from intervening); see also id. at 1149-50 (citing Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. 
City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1986) to argue that denying proponents the right 
to intervene may be an abuse of discretion by the court). 
 77. See id. at 1141 (stating that while the California Constitution establishes the 
initiative power, it does not explicitly dictate the rights and responsibilities of the 
official proponents of an initiative); see also id. at 1142-43 (recognizing that state law 
does not address whether the initiative proponents may appear in court to defend the 
validity of their sponsored measure). 
 78. See id. at 1144 (recognizing that most California cases provide very little 
guidance on the proper role of initiative proponents in defending the initiative).  But see 
id. at 1148-49 (concluding that permitting intervention by initiative proponents would 
safeguard the California voters’ initiative right, which must be closely guarded by 
courts); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 718 P.2d at 75 (finding that trial courts should allow 
proponents of an initiative to intervene when the government is required to defend the 
11
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Supreme Court was nevertheless persuaded that the Proponents were the 
proper party under California law to assert the State’s interests in the 
appellate court.79  While the California Supreme Court raised valid 
arguments regarding the Proponents’ Article III standing, it answered the 
wrong question. 
The California Supreme Court did not need to examine whether the 
Proponents should be allowed to intervene because they had already been 
allowed to intervene in the California Supreme Court and the District 
Court.80  Moreover, the plaintiffs never argued that the Proponents’ 
intervention was improper.81  Therefore, the controversy before the court 
clearly does not lie in whether California has historically allowed 
proponents of an initiative measure to intervene to defend that measure, nor 
whether these Proponents should be permitted to do so, but whether the 
Proponents have standing by themselves to bring an appeal in federal 
court.82 
Under federal law, the Proponents need standing to appeal the District 
Court’s ruling, even if it is undisputed that their intervention in the prior 
proceeding was valid.83  The question of whether the Proponents have 
standing to appeal the District Court’s decision turns on a different standard 
than the one California used in determining whether they should be allowed 
to intervene.84  To bring a case in federal court, a party must meet all three 
                                                          
initiative). 
 79. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1148-49 (finding that proponents must be allowed 
to intervene to defend the interests of the state because public officials do not always 
defend voter-approved initiative measures with “vigor”); see also id. (noting the court 
must guard the people’s right to exercise their initiative power, and Bldg Indus. Ass’n v. 
City of Camarillo encourages courts to allow proponents to intervene even when the 
public officials are defending the initiative so that the proponents may supplement the 
arguments made by the officials). 
 80. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the District 
Court allowed the Proponents to intervene to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 
8 in July 2009); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 69 (Cal. 2009) (stating that the 
California Supreme Court granted the Proponents’ motion to intervene on November 
19, 2008). 
 81. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1129 (stating that neither the plaintiffs nor any 
named defendants objected to the Proponents’ motion to intervene). 
 82. See Order Certifying a Question to the Supreme Court of California, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (asking whether the 
proponents of an initiative have the authority “to defend the constitutionality of the 
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative” (emphasis 
added)). 
 83. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (holding that intervenors must 
show independent standing to bring an appeal). 
 84. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (providing that a court must permit a party to 
intervene who files a timely motion, claims an interest relating to the subject of the 
action, would be unable to protect this interest if the case was dismissed, and whose 
interests would otherwise go unrepresented), and FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (providing that a 
court may allow a party to intervene who shares a common question of law and fact 
with the main parties), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
12
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standing requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Lujan.85  In a 
similar case in which initiative proponents intervened in the lower 
proceedings, the Ninth Circuit granted the proponents standing to defend 
the initiative in federal court.86  However, the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the Ninth Circuit did not engage in the correct analysis when 
granting standing to the proponents.87  The Supreme Court in that case 
reaffirmed that a party who intervened in a previous stage of the litigation 
still must show independent standing to bring an appeal.88 
In determining whether the Proponents have standing to appeal, the 
California Supreme Court seems not only to be phrasing the argument in 
terms of the Proponents’ undisputed right to intervene in the case, but also 
appears to be applying the standard used for allowing a party to intervene.89  
The court’s reasoning that the Proponents’ participation in the litigation 
ensures that their arguments as well as the state’s arguments are heard is 
very similar to the standard for intervention of right, but does little to meet 
the test for standing.90  The Proponents already successfully proved that 
they meet this standard, as evidenced by the fact that they were permitted 
to intervene in the trial stage; therefore, the federal court has already agreed 
with the California Supreme Court that the Proponents meet the 
requirements to intervene.91  The California Supreme Court’s analysis fails 
to consider that, in federal court, the right to intervene does not give a party 
standing to appeal the case if the original party fails to do so, and that a 
                                                          
(1992) (holding that Article III standing requires a showing of injury-in-fact, causation, 
and redressability). 
 85. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (finding that the three requirements for standing in 
federal court are important to identify disputes that are properly resolved in court). 
 86. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 (1997) 
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit granted standing to the initiative proponents on the 
basis that the proponents had the same ability as the Arizona Legislature to defend an 
initiative enacted by the people). 
 87. See id. at 65 (finding that initiative proponents did not meet the requirements of 
Article III standing, regardless of the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for allowing them to 
appear in court, and thus they could not bring the case in federal court). 
 88. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (holding that a party who files an appeal 
must independently fulfill every element of standing, regardless of whether that party 
was an intervenor). 
 89. See Perry II, 1151 (2011) (arguing that allowing proponents to intervene is 
essential to ensure that all legal arguments are advanced in defense of the proposition); 
id. at 1149 (noting that the Proponents are protecting the people’s interest). 
 90. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (stating that the court must allow a party to 
intervene if refusing to do so would impair the movant’s ability to assert its interests 
and those interests are not properly represented by the existing parties). 
 91. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the court 
granted the proponents motion to intervene on July 2009); see also Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 
at 1129 (recalling that none of the existing parties objected to the Proponents’ motion 
to intervene); Motion to Intervene, supra note 45, at *6-10 (asserting that plaintiffs are 
entitled to intervene as of right, and also satisfy the requirements for permissive 
intervention). 
13
Rappaport: California notwithstanding: Why the Ninth Circuit Erred in Follow
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
176 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:1 
stricter standard must be applied to grant standing to appeal.92 
B. Even if California’s Standing Analysis Was Pertinent to the Standing 
Controversy Before the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit Should Not Have 
Given Deference to California’s Decision Because It Is Bound by Federal 
Standing Jurisprudence, the Requirements of Which Are Not Taken into 
Consideration by the California Supreme Court. 
Three months after California issued its opinion responding to the Ninth 
Circuit’s certified question, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s 
finding that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.93  Before making this 
ruling, the Ninth Circuit first had to find that the Proponents had standing 
to bring the appeal.94  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit gave a great deal of 
deference to the California Supreme Court’s decision that the Proponents 
were authorized under state law to defend the initiative in place of elected 
officials.95 
1. The Ninth Circuit Gave Too Much Deference to the California Supreme 
Court’s Decision Because California’s Decision Is Only Relevant in 
California State Courts, and Proponents Do Not Meet the Injury-in-Fact 
Requirement of Article III Standing. 
The flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is that, even if California had 
analyzed the question under the correct standard, its decision would only be 
relevant, and should only be controlling, in California state court.96  
California relied extensively on state cases to make its point that the courts 
should fiercely guard the initiative power, and that proponents of initiatives 
have historically been granted standing to defend those initiatives in 
court.97  The California Supreme Court did not necessarily err in analyzing 
                                                          
 92. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (holding that a party must prove standing to 
appeal in federal court, even if the party intervened in previous proceedings). 
 93. See Perry III, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Proposition 8 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it could 
find no legitimate state reason to treat same-sex couples differently than heterosexual 
couples). 
 94. See id. at 1064-65 (noting that the court first had to decide whether the 
Proponents of Proposition 8 were entitled to appeal the lower court’s decision). 
 95. See id. (finding that it is for the state to decide who may represent that state’s 
interests in court); id. at 1072 (declaring that the court is bound by California’s 
determination that the Proponents have standing to defend the initiative); id. at 1073-74 
(reasoning that, because California has standing to defend the proposition in federal 
court and because California gave initiative proponents the power to defend the 
initiative and appeal a judgment invalidating the measure, Proponents therefore have 
Article III standing). 
 96. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (holding 
that a federal court must decide whether a party has standing under federal law). 
 97. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1143-44 (2011) (listing several California cases 
in which official initiative proponents were permitted to participate as parties in either 
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the question under state law, because California was only asked to brief the 
question of whether the initiative proponents have the power to defend the 
initiative under California law.98 
However, the Ninth Circuit is bound by federal law to assess Article III 
standing under federal standards, not under California law.99  Under federal 
law, the parties seeking standing must have suffered an injury-in-fact that is 
particularized to those individuals, which requires the court to engage in a 
different analysis from that used by the California Supreme Court.100 
First, the California Supreme Court argues that the Proponents are the 
most logical and appropriate party to assert the state’s interest in the 
initiative’s validity.101  However, the Supreme Court has historically 
rejected the argument that a party in a unique and logical position to bring a 
particular claim is necessarily injured such that the party has standing in 
federal court to bring the claim.102  In Lujan, the Court did not agree with 
the respondents’ argument that they had a special interest in environmental 
protection and were in a logical position to bring the claim, but instead held 
that the environmental group did not have standing because they could not 
prove an injury-in-fact.103  Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Morton, a 
conservation organization was a logical choice to bring a claim against a 
                                                          
pre- or post-election challenges to an initiative); id. at 1144 (listing cases in which 
official initiative proponents were permitted to appeal from an adverse judgment). 
 98. See Order Certifying a Question to the Supreme Court of California, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1192 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (asking whether the 
official proponents of an initiative measure may assert the state’s interest in the validity 
of that initiative under California law). 
 99. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 804 (holding that Article III standing is 
ultimately a question of federal law, and does not depend on standing in any state 
court); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819) (interpreting the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution to affirm that federal law is supreme over state 
law).  But see Perry III, 671 F.3d at 1071 (stating that California is an independent 
sovereign, and thus it is the state’s prerogative to decide for itself who may assert its 
interests); id. at 1072-73 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit is bound by California’s 
determination about standing). 
 100. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (describing that 
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing requires the plaintiff to suffer a 
concrete and particularized injury). 
 101. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1152 (arguing that the proponents of a voter-
approved initiative have a unique relationship to the measure that makes them reliable 
and vigorous advocates for the measure); id. at 1141-42 (citing statutory provisions 
which give the official proponents of an initiative a distinct role in regard to their 
sponsored initiative). 
 102. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (denying Defenders of Wildlife standing to 
bring a claim against a potentially harmful regulation, despite the fact that an 
environmental group is a logical party to bring such a claim); Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (finding that an environmental conservation organization did 
not have standing to seek an injunction against the development of a ski resort, even 
though the group claimed a special interest in the matter). 
 103. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (noting that in addition to failing the injury-in-
fact test, Defenders of Wildlife also failed to prove redressability of the injury). 
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development that would destroy natural habitats, but the Court still held 
that its unique position was not sufficient to grant its members standing in 
federal court.104  Therefore, the fact that the Proponents are a logical party 
to file an appeal does not mean that they meet the injury-in-fact 
requirement for Article III standing.105 
Second, the California Supreme Court concluded that if the Proponents 
do not defend the initiative, no one will.106  However, when, in Lujan, 
Defenders of Wildlife was prevented from bringing a suit against the 
potentially harmful regulation, whether another party would bring the suit 
was not of clear concern to the Court.107  The Court came to a similar 
conclusion in Sierra Club, where it was not concerned whether another 
party would seek an injunction against the development of the ski resort.108  
It follows, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit in this case should not take into 
consideration whether another party will appeal the case in lieu of the 
Proponents when deciding whether the Proponents have standing. 
Further, the California Supreme Court asserts that it has historically 
granted standing to initiative proponents.109  However, California cases on 
this matter should be of little relevance to the Ninth Circuit.  California law 
provides that a party who has been permitted to intervene in a lower court 
proceeding may appeal from an adverse judgment in California courts if the 
original party does not file an appeal.110  On the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has stated that in federal court, a party who intervened is not 
permitted to appeal from a lower court decision without first showing 
                                                          
 104. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 (stating that the injury-in-fact test requires 
more than just an injury to a cognizable interest, but also that the party bringing the suit 
be among the injured). 
 105. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (affirming that the injury-in-fact requirement 
dictates that the plaintiff must suffer a concrete and particularized injury). 
 106. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1139 (discussing the Proponents’ concern that the 
initiative would be invalidated if they were unable to appeal because no one else would 
defend the initiative). 
 107. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-77 (reaffirming that every party who brings a case 
in federal court must show that he or she is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct 
injury, and finding that the respondents did not have standing because they were not 
injured in a particularized way). 
 108. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-40 (declaring that the respondents did not 
have standing because they did not assert that they were personally among the injured); 
see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (determining that the 
argument that if the plaintiff could not litigate the issue no one could is not sufficient to 
confer standing to the plaintiff). 
 109. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1125 (stating that California courts have routinely 
permitted proponents of initiatives to defend their initiatives, and reasoning that this 
guards the peoples’ right to their initiative power). 
 110. See People v. Perris Irrigation Dist., 64 P. 399, 400 (Cal. 1901) (finding that a 
party who intervened as a defendant in the previous proceeding in California state court 
may avail itself of every remedy available to the original defendant, including the right 
to appeal from an adverse decision in California courts). 
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independent standing.111  California may provide that intervenors do not 
need to independently fulfill the Article III standing requirement to bring 
an appeal in state court, but it does not have the authority to assert that the 
same standard applies in federal court.112  Therefore, the cases that 
California cites on this matter should not serve to inform the Ninth Circuit 
of the proper way to dispose of whether the Proponents have standing in 
federal court. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cites to various cases to support its 
proposition that states should be allowed to affect their own internal 
operations.113  However, the cases it cites all clearly deal with internal 
regulations that do not affect federal matters.114  Who may assert a state’s 
interests in federal court, however, is not a purely internal issue because 
federal courts are not state actors, and who may appear in federal courts on 
matters arising under the United States Constitution is a question for 
federal, not state, law.115  The cases that the Ninth Circuit cites in this 
regard are, therefore, largely irrelevant in the case at hand. 
Finally, the injury-in-fact requirement prohibits parties from asserting 
injuries that are shared in substantially equal measures by a large portion of 
the population.116  Here, the Proponents claim that they assert the general 
interest of the people of California.117  As the plaintiffs correctly point out, 
and as the Proponents seem to agree with, the initiative power granted by 
                                                          
 111. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (holding that an intervenor 
who files an appeal absent the original party must independently fulfill every element 
of standing). 
 112. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (holding 
that federal law governs standing in federal court, and that standing in state court does 
not confer standing to a party in federal court). 
 113. See Perry III, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) and other cases to find that it is not for the federal 
government to control the practices of a state, including controlling who may assert its 
interests). 
 114. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding that Congress may not direct state law 
enforcement officers to enforce a federal regulatory scheme); New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (finding that the federal government cannot require a 
state to accept ownership of waste generated within its borders, or regulate waste 
according to Congress’s orders); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579-80 (1911) (holding 
that Congress may not dictate where a state shall locate its capital). 
 115. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing that federal courts have jurisdiction 
over all matters arising under the United States Constitution). 
 116. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 
(1974) (rejecting a claim by a citizen who merely asserted an abstract injury from 
Congress’s nonobservance of the Constitution); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166, 179-80 (1974) (establishing that the injury-in-fact requirement demands more than 
just a generalized grievance, and that the plaintiff must have suffered a particularized 
injury). 
 117. See Perry III, 671 F.3d at 1073 (stating the Proponents claim that they 
represent the people’s interest in defending the validity of an initiative that the voters 
enacted). 
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the California Constitution is granted to the electorate as a whole, and not 
just those citizens who propose initiatives.118  In 2008, fifty-two percent of 
the California electorate voted to enact Proposition 8.119  Therefore, the 
injury that the Proponents assert is a generalized grievance to over half of 
the voters of the most heavily populated state in the nation.120  Supreme 
Court cases have repeatedly affirmed that this generalized grievance in the 
validity of an initiative is not sufficient to confer Article III standing to the 
proponents of the initiative in question.121 
2. The California Supreme Court Erroneously Disregards Precedent Set 
Forth by Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, and the Ninth Circuit 
Should Not Follow California’s Lead in Distinguishing This Case. 
The California Supreme Court disregards the precedent set forth in 
Arizonans for Official English, instead distinguishing Arizonans from this 
case.122  However, the plaintiffs were correct to rely on that case to argue 
that initiative proponents do not have standing in federal court to appeal 
from a decision invalidating their initiatives.123  The Court in Arizonans 
outlines three primary reasons why the proponents of an initiative should 
not have standing to appeal the lower court’s decision.124  The California 
Supreme Court focuses on the one distinguishing factor between Arizonans 
                                                          
 118. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (granting the initiative power to the electorate); 
Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1139 (2011) (stating the plaintiff’s contention that the 
proponents of an initiative no longer have a particularized interest in the validity of the 
initiative once it has been passed by the people because the electorate then equally 
shares the interest). 
 119. California Secretary of State, General Election – Statement of Vote: Votes for 
and Against State Ballot Measures, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/
2008_general/7_votes_for_against.pdf. 
 120. See id. (depicting that 7,001,084 people voted in favor of Proposition 8). 
 121. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65-66 (1997) 
(holding that initiative sponsors are not recognized agents of the people, and must have 
suffered a particularized injury beyond that suffered by the entire electorate in order to 
possess standing to defend their initiative in federal court); cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that an organization’s longstanding interest in a 
problem is not by itself sufficient to give the organization an injury for federal standing 
purposes). 
 122. Compare Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1136-37 (concluding that, despite precedent to 
the contrary, the Proponents had standing under state law to assert the state’s interest in 
federal court), with Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 66 (finding that initiative proponents do not 
have standing in federal court to defend the initiative they sponsored because they lack 
particularized injury). 
 123. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1135-36 (noting that the plaintiffs pointed out that, 
in a similar case, the Supreme Court expressed “grave doubts” that initiative 
proponents possessed standing in federal court). 
 124. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (finding that the proponents should not have 
standing because they were not elected, there was no state law authorizing them to 
appear in court on behalf of their initiative, and the Supreme Court had never identified 
initiative proponents as proper parties to defend their initiative). 
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and this case, namely that in Arizonans, there was no state law that 
authorized the proponents to be a party to the case.125  In contrast, the 
California Supreme Court argued that because California created such a 
law, the rationale in Arizonans could not be applied to Perry.126 
However, the California Supreme Court failed to consider that the other 
two reasons put forth by the Supreme Court for denying the proponents’ 
standing in Arizonans apply to Perry as well.127  First, like the initiative 
proponents in Arizonans, the Proponents of Proposition 8 were not elected 
by the California electorate and were not state officials.128  The Ninth 
Circuit likewise overlooks this key similarity between the two cases in 
arguing that if California grants authority to the California Attorney 
General to defend a ballot initiative, it should be able to grant the 
Proponents the same.129 
Secondly, Perry is indistinguishable from Arizonans in that neither the 
Supreme Court in Arizonans nor either relevant court in this case has 
previously allowed initiative proponents to defend the validity of a state 
statute in federal court.130  The California Supreme Court instead focuses 
solely on the fact that Arizona did not have a state law authorizing initiative 
proponents to appear in federal court to defend their ballot measure, and 
fails to analyze the other factors that the Supreme Court puts forth in 
                                                          
 125. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1136-37 (finding that the Court in Arizonans 
substantially relied on the fact that it was aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative 
sponsors as agents of the state). 
 126. See id. at 1137 (reasoning that nothing in Arizonans suggests that initiative 
proponents should not have standing if the state has authorized the proponents to assert 
the state’s interest). 
 127. See id. at 1136-37 (failing to note that the Proponents in Perry were not elected 
by the people, and that the Ninth Circuit has never allowed initiative proponents to 
defend the initiatives that they sponsored). 
 128. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (reasoning that AOE and its members were not 
elected officials); Perry III, 671 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
Proponents were California residents who collected voter signatures and filed petitions 
with the California government to place an initiative on the 2008 California ballot).  
But see Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (granting standing to the Speaker of 
the New Jersey Assembly and the President of the New Jersey Senate to appeal a 
decision holding a state statute unconstitutional because they were state legislators). 
 129. See Perry III, 671 F.3d at 1074 (noting that when the Attorney General of 
California defends the validity of a state statute in federal court, she does not need to 
independently fulfill the requirements of standing because she is filling in for the state, 
and arguing the same of the Proponents). 
 130. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (noting that the Court had never identified 
initiative proponents as qualified parties to defend measures under Article III); Perry 
III, 671 F.3d at 1074 (reasoning that the Ninth Circuit based its opinion on California’s 
decision to grant the Proponents authority to assert the interests of the state, but cited 
no case in which the Ninth Circuit had previously allowed initiative proponents to 
appeal from a judgment invalidating their initiative); Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1149 
(finding that Bldg. Indus. Ass’n was the only case in which California was faced with 
whether to allow initiative proponents to participate as a party, and that the court 
merely allowed them to intervene in the litigation). 
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Arizonans.131  Therefore, because the Proponents do not meet two of the 
three prongs set forth in Arizonans, they do not have standing to bring an 
appeal in federal court in place of state officials.132 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Congress can create statutes that confer rights on individuals, and the 
invasion of these rights can permit individuals to bring lawsuits in federal 
court.133  Moreover, courts have recognized that Article III standing may be 
based on these statutorily-created injuries.134  In Perry, the California 
Supreme Court arguably created an injury when it ruled that initiative 
proponents are authorized to assert the state’s interest in federal court if the 
state officials fail to do so.135  In reasoning that the Proponents had standing 
solely due to the California Supreme Court’s law granting standing to 
initiative proponents, the Ninth Circuit based its determination that the 
Proponents had standing to bring the appeal in federal court on this 
judicially created injury.136 
However, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife suggests that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning is flawed, and that the court places too much emphasis 
on the newly created California law granting power to initiative 
proponents.137  Lujan holds that in order for a party to have standing in 
                                                          
 131. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1136-37 (reasoning that the Court in Arizonans 
would have no reason to deny the initiative proponents standing if there was a state law 
authorizing them to assert the state’s interests). 
 132. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65 (holding that proponents were denied standing 
not just because there was no Arizona law authorizing them to assert the state’s 
interests, but also because the Supreme Court had never identified initiative proponents 
as proper parties to defend their initiatives in federal court, and because the initiative 
proponents were not elected state officials). 
 133. See, e.g., Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1972) (holding that no person shall be 
subject to discrimination based on sex in any federally funded educational program); 
see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (holding that a welfare 
recipient is injured when she does not receive notice and opportunity for an evidentiary 
hearing prior to the termination of her benefits). 
 134. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (holding that the injury 
requirement of Article III may exist based on the invasion of statutorily-created legal 
rights). 
 135. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1126-27 (holding that the proponents of an initiative 
as well as the electorate as a whole would be injured if state officials could invalidate 
an initiative measure by failing to defend it in court, and that Proponents must be 
allowed to step in to prevent this injury). 
 136. See Perry III, 671 F.3d 1052, 1073 (9th Cir. 2012) (asserting that the Ninth 
Circuit was bound by California’s new law, and holding that the only important 
consideration was that California authorized initiative proponents to represent the 
interest of the state); id. at 1072 (finding that the California Supreme Court announced 
that California law gives initiative proponents the power to defend the validity of those 
initiatives in lieu of state officials); see also Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th at 1136-37 (reasoning 
that California law allows initiative proponents to defend the validity of an initiative). 
 137. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (finding that 
standing is harder to establish in cases against the government where the plaintiff is not 
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federal court, that party must have suffered an injury-in-fact.138  Courts 
have held that while Article III standing may be based on injuries arising 
out of statutes, the mere invasion of statutorily-created rights is not 
sufficient to grant standing.139  Instead, the injury-in-fact requirement 
demands that the injury suffered as a result of the violation of a statute be 
particular to the party seeking relief.140 
The Court in Lujan reasons that should Congress be allowed to create 
injuries that automatically confer standing on the injured, it would 
contravene important functions of standing such as separation of powers 
and judicial efficiency.141  Because the Court is concerned with the breach 
of judicial power in adjudicating claims of public rights, the same functions 
of standing would be violated if California was allowed to confer standing 
on the Proponents by virtue of their broadly shared injury.142  Moreover, 
the United States Congress undoubtedly has more power than states and 
their judiciaries in controlling the federal standing requirement.143  The 
Constitution and cases interpreting it clearly hold that Congress’s laws are 
supreme over the states’ laws.144  Additionally, cases are explicit in holding 
                                                          
the particular object of the government action or inaction). 
 138. See id. at 563 (requiring a party seeking relief to be directly affected apart from 
that party’s special interest). 
 139. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (noting that the assertion of the 
right to particular government conduct and injury based on the government acting 
differently, does not alone satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing); 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (holding that the appellant’s injury 
does not confer standing unless the appellant can show that she is in immediate danger 
of suffering a direct and personal injury). 
 140. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (holding that the concrete injury requirement still 
must be present in suits against the government regardless of whether the plaintiff 
asserts a statutorily-created injury); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) 
(recognizing that broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of 
Article III standing is different from disregarding the requirement that the party seeking 
relief has suffered a particularized injury). 
 141. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (noting that permitting Congress to convert the 
public interest into an individual right would take away the Executive’s duty to ensure 
that the laws be faithfully executed); see also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 
(1944) (holding that the standing requirement of Article III ensures that courts only 
adjudicate claims of infringement on individual rights, not public rights). 
 142. See Perry II, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1149 (2011) (stating that it is clear that the 
Proponents assert the people’s interest, and not merely their own). 
 143. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that federal laws shall be supreme over 
state laws, and that federal courts are bound by federal law). 
 144. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001) 
(interpreting the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to hold that laws 
made by Congress preempt state laws when they expressly exclude state laws, when 
they already occupy a legislative field, or when state laws conflict with already existing 
federal laws); cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941) (holding that when 
the federal government has made laws in a certain field, those laws are supreme in that 
field, and states may not alter or change those Congressional statutes). 
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that Article III standing as a field is preempted by federal law.145  
Therefore, if the Supreme Court has established that Congress may not 
create injuries that surpass the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III 
standing, certainly state courts may not do so either.  As a result, Lujan’s 
determination that statutorily-created injuries are not sufficient to grant 
standing should extend to state courts as well, and the Ninth Circuit may 
not find that the Proponents have standing simply because the California 
Supreme Court determined that they are injured. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Article III standing serves many important functions.146  The strict 
standing doctrine outlined in Article III and further delineated in Supreme 
Court cases requires that a party suffer a cognizable injury, or an injury-in-
fact, in order to bring a lawsuit.147  This requirement is necessary not only 
to ensure that courts only hear cases and controversies, but also to guard 
the fairness of the judicial process.148  Moreover, should parties be allowed 
to bring suits in which they are not particularly injured, the rights of the 
public may be placed at risk.149 
Courts have historically understood these important functions of 
standing, and have safeguarded the strict standing requirement prescribed 
in Lujan and other Supreme Court cases.150  However, the Ninth Circuit 
previously disregarded the established requirements for Article III standing 
in Arizonans for Official English, where it held that initiative proponents 
asserting only a generalized grievance may defend their initiatives in 
federal court.151  The Supreme Court in Arizonans overturned the Ninth 
                                                          
 145. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (holding that 
whether a party has standing in federal court is a matter of federal law). 
 146. See Elliot, supra note 8, at 461-63 (explaining that the standing doctrine serves 
to limit the cases heard by Article III courts to cases and controversies, allows courts to 
decline to hear cases that are better resolved through the political process, and prevents 
Congress from overreaching and conscripting courts). 
 147. See supra Part II.A (outlining the federal standing requirement). 
 148. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 
1694 (2007) (explaining that a strict standing requirement guards the rights of the 
parties on both sides of the litigation). 
 149. See id. at 1699-700 (holding that to allow a party to adjudicate an injury shared 
substantially by a large number of people would negate the right of those not bringing 
the suit to decide against adjudication). 
 150. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (holding that an 
organization did not have standing to sue in federal court because its members were not 
affected in any meaningful way); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
176-77 (1974) (holding that a party does not have standing if its asserted injury is 
shared by a substantial portion of the population). 
 151. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 (1997) (noting 
that the Ninth Circuit granted standing to AOE so that they might defend the initiative 
they sponsored because it found that the proponents had the same rights as the Arizona 
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Circuit’s decision, ruling that initiative proponents do not have standing to 
defend the initiatives they sponsored.152 
Because the California Supreme Court in Perry relied on the wrong 
standard when granting standing to the Proponents to appeal in federal 
court, and because the Ninth Circuit is bound by federal law rather than 
state law when deciding who has standing in Article III courts, the 
reviewing court should find that the Proponents do not have standing.153  
Furthermore, because Congress may not bypass Article III standing 
requirements by statutorily creating injuries that automatically confer 
standing upon the injured, courts should likewise be prohibited from doing 
so.154  Therefore, courts in the future should be barred from basing Article 
III standing on a judicial finding that the party is injured, as well as solely 
based on a state court’s determination that a party is authorized to assert 
that state’s interests. 
 
                                                          
Legislature). 
 152. See id. at 65-66 (holding that initiative sponsors do not have standing in federal 
court because they are not agents of the people, nor do they assert a qualifying injury-
in-fact). 
 153. See supra Part III (explaining that the requirement for intervention is different 
than the requirement for standing, and that Article III standing requirements necessitate 
a different analysis than that engaged in by the California Supreme Court and the Ninth 
Circuit). 
 154. See supra Part IV (noting that, while Congress can create injuries that may be 
alleged in support of standing, these injuries are not sufficient to grant standing in an 
Article III court, and arguing that this should apply to injuries created by courts as 
well). 
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